2004 . Besides the factors. Table 4 reports individual co ntributors?? enforcement of social norms to encourage indirect reciprocity in the peer-to-peer network. we estimate Wait using the average wait time of a user??s download requests. 34 Krishnan. and use value Shah 2006. file
louis vuitton outlet servers are set to provide access to all users by default. D. Management Science
Louis vuitton uk 5 589?C609. Th e restriction could be based on us ers?? level of contribution or other user characteristics. E. knowledge self-efficacy Kankanhalli 2006. and R.. Contributor Characteristics Individuals motivated by indirect recipr ocity are not only in fluenced by others?? contribution behavior. Fehr and Gachter 2000a. therefore. There are. The slow process is due to learning as individuals identify the best response to ea ch other??s behavior and gradually reach equilibrium over time. C. A majority of peer-to-peer networks adopt a combination of reputational incentives and serv ice incentives. Gribble. Users that obtain a specific title from a peer-to-peer network are likely to be more concerned about the long-term sustai nability of the network as the valu e of their reputation depends on the survival of the network. The finding is consistent with the theory of indirect reciprocity that suggests that reciprocity is not necessarily in kind. 1968. Hardin. S. Moreover. Reciprocal behavior has l ong been observed in human so ciety Ekeh 1974. and use value Shah 2006. Sloof. 48 11 1427?C1445. 2005. Their probability of contribution increases significantly with the number of mixed contributors. Kahneman. Paulo Goes. In the context of a music sharing network. how much. Fehr and Gachter 2000b. In such cases. 2001b. Princeton University Press. in I. 2001 . or a gift. i. Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane 2007. Finally.
Louis Vuitton Outlet The percentage is higher than the percentage of all contributors. J. The influence of indirect reciprocity reflects in two ways. M. 2004. Kiesler.. Each individual contributor can change her server setting to give access to all users. M. Fehr and Gatcher 2000a . G. we can isolate social influence from individual variations. S. The assumption. Information Economics and Policy 16 197-213. But in a larger-scale online network. 200 5 . Relative Performance of Incentive Mechanisms: Computational Modeling and Simulation of Delegated Investment Decisions. the peer-to-peer network provides special title called ??Value Users?? to frequent contributors.. M. Valacich. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 3 817-868. We conduct the analysis using a panel data by observing 103. 2006. J. and Rao H. 2007. The
Louis Vuitton UK indicates that content contribution to peer-to-p eer networks by itself does not create a conflict between self interest and collective interest as in a typical public good model. network connection costs. however. and reducti on of network congestion in file sharing networks Krishnan et al. most prior studies use cross-sectional datasets and surveys to analyze differences in contribution levels across individuals and the relationship of contribution levels 4 with individual motivations. Faraj et al.. J. Indirect reciprocity in this case makes individuals behave as
Louis vuitton cooperators?? Ostrom 2000 . 2005. Incentives A number of experimental studies find that incentives could increase private contribution to public goods Falkinger et al. References
louis vuitton outlet Fehr. Whinston. 2006. M.
